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Regulatory reforms in European network industries are strongly influenced by 
legal decisions. The cases considered in this paper not only initiated the liberali-
zation process of the markets for network services but also provided an impor-
tant signaling function for the remaining regulatory problems: localization of 
network-specific market power, abolishment of grandfathering rights, ex ante 
regulation of network-specific market power instead of negotiated unregulated 
network access, incentive regulation instead of cost-based regulation. The 
process towards sector-symmetric market power regulation based on economi-
cally founded principles gains increasing relevance. Nevertheless, there are fur-
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The development of the legal regulatory framework in European network indus-
tries has been a time-consuming and path-dependent reform process. The evolu-
tion of regulatory reforms can be differentiated into two periods. The first period 
from the 1980s until 1998 can be characterized by the paradigm shift from legal-
ly protected global (end-to-end) regulated monopolies towards liberalized mar-
kets for network services with free entry to network infrastructure capacity mar-
kets. The second period from 1998 onwards can be characterized by the devel-
opment of open access provision policies and subsequent regulation of access to 
network infrastructures. The roots of this reform process are laid down in the 
competition rulings of the Treaty of Rome in 1957. In the meantime a large 
body of European and national laws of the EU Member Countries has evolved, 
providing the legal basis for ex ante regulation in the different European net-
work industries.  
 
The basic hypothesis of this paper is that landmark decisions of the courts (Eu-
ropean Court of Justice as well as National High Courts) played an important 
role in getting the bandwagon towards regulatory reform running. Such court 
cases are of particular interest because they are not only solving conflicts among 
parties in dispute, but at the same time they are revealing fundamental gaps in 
the existing regulatory law. Public attention to this signaling function of court 
decisions is rather modest in the European regulatory reform debate. In contrast, 
in the U.S. the recognition of the fruitful function of Supreme Court decisions 
within the process of reforming antitrust and regulation policy based on the 




In the following, several landmark law cases are considered which reveal the 
complementary dimensions of regulatory reform in Europe: free entry into net-
work industries (section 2), proper identification of market failure (section 3), a 
competitive framework for network infrastructure capacities (section 4), the role 
of negotiated access versus regulated access (section 5), and finally, the fallacies 
                                                 
1   See e.g. Sidak, Spulber (1998), pp. 216; Kovacic (2002); Kolbe,Tye, Myers (1993).   2 
of cost-based access regulation (section 6). Each section starts with the relevant 
law case followed by the characterization of the regulatory reform process   
afterwards and the characterization of the remaining reform potentials.  
 
 
2.  Free entry into markets for network services 
 
The reform process of the liberalization of network service markets in Europe 




parties in dispute were the European Parliament supported by the Commission 
of the European Communities pleading for liberalization of the European trans-
portation markets against the Council of the European Communities pleading for 
the status quo of legally protected entry barriers. Based on the result of a statuto-
ry control of the Treaty of Rome the European Court’s judgment concluded that 
the Council failed to fulfill its obligation with respect to the common transport 
policy. With this decision the Member Countries of the European Community 
were obliged to abolish all legal entry barriers to transportation service markets, 
so that non-discriminatory free entry became possible. 
In the following, the process of entry deregulation of European network service 
markets will be considered. 
 
 




A cornerstone for the take-off of the development towards competition in   
European telecommunications markets was the Commission of the European 
Communities’ British Telecom decision in 1982 and its confirmation by the 
                                                 
2   Judgment of the Court of 22 May 1985. – European Parliament v Council of the 
European Communities. – Common transport policy – Obligations of the Council. – 
Case 13/83. European Court reports 1985, p. 01513.  
3   Judgment of the Court of 20 March 1985. – Italian Republic v Commission of the 
European Communities. – Abuse of a dominant position (Article 86) – Public under-
takings (Article 90) – International agreements (Article 234) – Article 222 – Article 
190 of the Treaty. – Case 41/43. European Court reports 1985, p. 00873.   3 
European Court in 1985. The point of contention was British Telecom’s inten-
tion to prevent message-forwarding agencies from offering certain services to 
the detriment of their customers operating in other Member States. According to 
the decision, British Telecom should no longer be permitted to forbid the   
high-speed forwarding of telex messages between foreign countries by private 
message-forwarding agencies in Great Britain. The legal monopoly of British 
Telecom in public networks would not justify the prohibition of new services 
based on technical progress.  
 
The procedural setting of this case was most unusual because the Italian gov-
ernment and not British Telecom appealed against the Commission’s decision. 
Moreover, the British government intervened, taking sides not with the Italian 
government, but with the Commission. The important message of the British 
Telecom case was that the Commission of the European Community was able to 
apply the Treaty of Rome’s competition rules to the public telecommunications 
administrations of the different Member Countries (Schulte-Braucks, 1986). 
 
 
2.2.  Liberalization of the markets for network services 
 
After these decisions of the European Court in 1985 the debate on the liberaliza-
tion of the European network services markets gained increasing momentum. 
Nevertheless, a longer transition period of phasing-out legal entry barriers to 
different service network markets occurred. It was only in 1998 that most statu-
tory monopolies were transferred into constitutional guarantees of open markets. 
The liberalization of transport services in Europe was not only focussed on air-
lines, trucks and ships, but the role of (potential) entry to European railway net-
works was also taken into account.
4
                                                 
4   For truck transportation services, see Council Regulation (EEC) No 3916/90 of 21 
December 1990 on measures to be taken in the event of a crisis in the market in the 
carriage of goods by road, OJ L 375/10, 31. 12. 1990; for air transportation services, 
see the air liberalization package, in particular Council-Regulation (EEC) No 
2410/92 of 23 July 1992 amending Regulation (EEC) No 3975/87 laying down the 
procedure for the application of the rules on competition to undertakings in the air 
transport sector, OJ L 240/18, 24. 08. 1992; for the market for train services, see 
 Since the British Telecom Case the market   4 
for telecommunications services has been gradually opened in all European 
countries, starting with value added network services in the eighties and finally, 




The process of opening the markets for network services also reached the other 
network industries. In the meantime, in the electricity and gas sectors the free 
choice of final consumers (eligibility) has been guaranteed in all European coun-
tries.
6 The market for postal services has been gradually opened since 1997;
7 the 






2.3.  Remaining reform potentials 
 
It is well known from regulatory economics that legal entry barriers, administra-
tive price setting, prohibition of cabotage etc. is nothing but a publicly sanc-
tioned monopoly or cartel agreement, and therefore counterproductive from the 
economic welfare point of view. Consequences of active and potential competi-
tion in the markets for network services are the abolishment of monopoly rents 
with a subsequent reduction of tariff levels, increasing incentives for cost effi-
                                                                                                                                                          
Council-Directive 91/440/EEC of 29 July 1991 on the development of the Commu-
nity’s railways, OJ L237/25, 24.08.1991.   
5   Commission Directive 96/19/EC of 13 March 1996 amending Directive 90/388/EEC 
with regard to the implementation of full competition in the telecommunications 
markets, OJ L 74/13, 22. 3. 1996 (the ‘Full Competition Directive’). 
6   Directive 2003/54/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 
2003 concerning common rules for the internal market in electricity and repealing 
Directive 96/92/EC, OJ L 176/37, 15. 7. 2003 (Art. 21); Directive 2003/55/EC of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2003 concerning common rules 
for the internal markets in natural gas and repealing Directive 98/30/EC, OJ L 
176/57, 15. 7. 2003 (Art. 23). 
7   Directive 2002/39/EC of the European Parliament and the Council of 10 June 2002 
amending Directive 97/67/EC with regard to the further opening to competition of 
Community postal service, OJ L 176/21, 5.7.2002.  
8   Directive 2008/6/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 February 
2008 amending Directive 97/67/EC with regard to the full accomplishment of the  
international market of Community postal services, OJ L52/3, 27.2.2008.    5 
ciency, optimization of service networks, more rapid reaction of prices to 
changes in the cost and demand structure, and increasing price-quality options.  
 
Nevertheless, the reform process of liberalizing network services was strongly 
path-dependent. After all, the liberalization process took more than two decades 
and is still not completely finished. European postal markets will only be com-
pletely liberalized in 2011. The provision of local public transport cannot seri-
ously be called competitive. In Germany, the markets for long-distance (inter-
city) bus services are not competitive; entry to the markets as well as prices are 
still under public control (Monopolkommission, 2007, p. 33).
9
 
 The markets for 
water provision services in Germany are far from being liberalized (Rüttgers, 
2009, pp. 177).  
 
3.  Localization of network-specific market power 
 
The more the aim of liberalizing network services succeeded, the more did the 
focus of EC directives as well as the national sector-specific laws shift to the 
problems of access to network infrastructure. The division of labour between 
general competition law and sector-specific market power regulation became 
highly relevant. Remaining reform potentials therefore centre on the vertical 
perspective of non-discriminatory access to infrastructures complementary to the 
network service level. 
 
 
3.1.  Judgment of the European Court: The ‘Bronner’ Case 
 
The starting point of this case was the question of the Higher Regional Court, 
Vienna raised to the European Court whether refusal of a media undertaking to 
include a rival daily newspaper of another undertaking in its newspaper home-
delivery scheme was an abuse of a dominant position.
10
                                                 
9   § 45(2) in combination with § 9 Personenbeförderungsgesetz (PBefG). 
 The parties in dispute 
10  Judgment of the Court (Sixth Chamber) of 26 November 1998. – Oscar Bronner 
GmbH&Co.KG v Mediaprint Zeitungs-und Zeitschriftenverlag GmbH&Co.KG,    6 
were the newspaper group Mediaprint holding a substantial share of the market 
in daily newspapers and Oscar Bronner with a moderate market share. The claim 
of Oscar Bronner to get access to the home-delivery system of Mediaprint was 
denied by the European Court, in particular with the following reasoning (recital 
44 of the Court decision): ‘Moreover, it does not appear that there are any tech-
nical, legal or even economic obstacles capable of making it impossible, or even 
unreasonably difficult, for any other publisher of daily newspapers to establish, 
alone or in cooperation with other publishers, its own nationwide home-delivery 
scheme and use it to distribute its own daily newspapers’.  
 
Although the European Court did not refer to the essential facilities doctrine ex-
plicitly in his decision, Advocate General Jacobs in his opinion pointed out the 
relevance of this doctrine for the case.
11 The essential facilities doctrine has its 
origins in US antitrust law.
12
 
 In accordance with this doctrine, a facility can only 
be regarded as essential if the following two conditions are fulfilled: (1) market 
entry to the complementary market is not actually possible without access to this 
facility, and (2) providers in the complementary market cannot, using reasonable 
effort, duplicate the facility; substitutes do not exist either (Areeda, Hoverkamp, 
1988). 
According to the findings of the Advocate General a newspaper’s home-delivery 
system does not fulfil the criteria of an essential facility. 
 
                                                                                                                                                          
Mediaprint Zeitungsvertriebsgesellschaft mbH&Co.KG and Mediaprint Anzeigenge-
sellschaft mbH&Co.KG. –  Reference for a preliminary ruling: Oberlandesgericht 
Wien – Austria. – Article 86 of the EC Treaty – Abuse of a dominant position –  
Refusal of a media undertaking holding a dominant position in the territory of a 
Member State to include a rival daily newspaper of another undertaking in the same 
Member State in its newspaper home-delivery scheme. – Case C-7/97. European 
Court report 1998, p. I-07791. 
11  Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs delivered on 28 May 1998, Case C-7/97, Oscar 
Bronner GmbH&Co.KG v Mediaprint Zeitungs- und Zeitschriftenverlag GmbH&Co. 
KG and Others. European Court Report 1998, p. I-07791.  
12  The case that established this doctrine is: U.S. Supreme Court, United States v. Ter-
minal Railroad Association of St. Louis (224 US 383 (1912) and 236 US 194 
(1915)).   7 
3.2.  The evolution of access regulation 
 
The essential facilities doctrine provided an important starting point for the 
question, in which network areas access regulation might be necessary. In Euro-
pean telecommunications policy the European Commission’s Access Notice 
pointed out the importance of the concept of the essential facilities indispensable 
for reaching customers (section 68) within the context of EU competition law, in 
particular Article 82 of the EC Treaty.
13 With the supply of access to the essen-
tial facility to one or more competitors, the emergence of new products or ser-
vices should not be hampered (Ungerer, 2000, p. 217). Nevertheless, in the sub-
sequent reviews of the EU regulatory framework for telecommunications the 
reference to the essential facilities doctrine lost relevance. The unspecific regu-
latory obligations based on the EU directives in the 1999 review package – in 
particular the Framework Directive
14 and the Access Directive
15 – resulted in 
increasingly complex and contradictory decisions and statements. In particular, 
in order to identify significant market power, the Commission’s guidelines for-
mulate a long list of criteria indicating the existence of a dominant position.
16
                                                 
13  Notice on the application of the competition rules to access agreements in the tele-
communications sector – framework, relevant markets and principles, OJ 1998 C 
265/2-28. 
 In 
2003, however, the European Commission made progress in identifying the 
regulatory basis, recommending the so-called ‘three criteria test’. The Commis-
sion’s criteria were as follows: ‘The first criterion is the presence of high and 
14  Directive 2002/21/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 March 
2002 on a common regulatory framework for electronic communications networks 
and services (Framework Directive), OJ 2002 L 108/33. 
15  Directive 2002/19/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on access to, 
and interconnection of, electronic communications networks and associated facilities 
(Access Directive), OJ 2002 L 108/7. 
16  These criteria include: overall size of the undertaking, control of infrastructure not 
easily duplicated, technological advantages or superiority, absence or low level of 
countervailing buying power, easy or privileged access to capital markets/financial 
resources, product/services diversifications, economies of scale, economies of scope, 
vertical integration, a highly developed distribution and sales network, absence of 
potential competition and barriers to expansion. Commission guidelines on market 
analysis and the assessment of significant market power under the Community regu-
latory framework for electronic communications network and services, OJ 2002 C 
165/6-31.   8 
non-transitory entry barriers whether of structural, legal or regulatory nature. … 
[T]he second criterion admits only those markets, the structure of which does 
not tend towards effective competition within the relevant time horizon. … The 
third criterion is that application of competition law alone would not adequately 
address the market failure(s) concerned.’
17
 
 These criteria constitute a revival of 
the relevance of the essential facilities doctrine for the identification of market 
power.  
 
3.3.  Remaining reform potentials 
 
Case-by-case identification of essential facilities by court judgments does not 
guarantee a consistent localization of market power in liberalized network indus-
tries. The proper design of ex ante regulation requires generalizing the concept 
of the essential facilities doctrine to a class of facilities characterized by net-
work-specific market power. The concept of the monopolistic bottleneck pro-
vides an economically founded approach which can be applied consistently 
within a network industry as well as sector-symmetrically over all network in-
dustries (Knieps, 1997, pp. 328-331). The characteristics of a monopolistic bot-
tleneck are: 
(1)  A facility is necessary for reaching customers, i.e. no other facility exists 
as an active substitute. This is the case when a natural monopoly exists 
and a single provider is able to provide the facility more cheaply than sev-
eral providers; 
(2)  A facility cannot reasonably be duplicated in order to control the active 
provider; and there is no potential substitute. This is the case when the 
costs of the facility are irreversible and no longer decision-relevant for the 
incumbent provider. 
                                                 
17  Commission Recommendation of 11 February 2003 on relevant product and service 
markets within the electronic communications sector susceptible to ex ante regula-
tion in accordance with Directive 2002/21/EC of the European Parliament and of the 
Council on a common regulatory framework for electronic communication networks 
and services (2003/311/EC), OJ 2003 L 114/45-49, recital 9.   9 
In fact, the above mentioned ‘three criteria test’ in the Commission Recommen-
dation of February 2003 is consistent with the concept of monopolistic bottle-
necks. The presence of high and non-transitory entry barriers describes a natural 
monopoly in combination with irreversible costs (Blankart, Knieps, Zenhäusern, 
2007, p. 423). Such monopolistic bottlenecks may arise with ‘earthbound’ net-
works and sub-networks, e.g. with route infrastructures (railway tracks, train 
stations, airports, electricity transmission grids etc.), but also with regional and 
local water, sewage and energy networks (Knieps, 2006, pp. 53-64). After global 
market liberalization, the regulation of market power in these monopolistic bot-
tleneck areas remains an important task to prevent the distortion of active and 
potential competition in the complementary service markets. In particular, ade-
quate regulation of access conditions such as quality and tariffs needs to be im-
plemented to guarantee non-discriminatory access to monopolistic bottleneck 
components.  
 
As long as monopolistic bottlenecks are not involved (e.g. in the newspapers 
home-delivery services at issue in the ‘Bronner’ Case), unregulated bargaining 
solutions on access conditions are not only beneficial to the carriers themselves, 
but also improve the market performance of the network services provided to the 
customers. Irrespective of the market size of the carriers involved, inefficient 
suppliers of access services are rapidly confronted with strongly decreasing 




4.  Markets for infrastructure capacities  
 
A central cornerstone of the EU Directives is the objective of non-
discriminatory access to network infrastructures at transparent, non-
discriminatory and reasonable tariffs.
18
                                                 
18  For railway infrastructures see Directive 2001/14/EC, Art. 8; for electricity grids see 
Directive 2003/54/EC, Art. 19; for natural gas pipelines see Directive 2003/55/EC, 
Art. 18; for telecommunications networks see Access Directive 2002/19/EC, Art. 10; 
for slot allocation at Community’s airports see Council-Regulation (EEC) No. 95/93.  
 In order to realize these objectives the   10 
evolution of competition on markets for network capacities should not be ham-




4.1.  Judgment of the British High Court:  
   The Guernsey Transport Board Case 
 
Competition on the airline service markets has been the leading principle laid 
down in the Commission Regulation of 23 July 1992.
19 In January 1993 the 
Council of the European Communities adopted a Regulation
20 on common rules 
for the allocation of slots at Community airports which established a legally 
binding framework applicable in all Member States. The goal was that the allo-
cation of slots at congested airports should be based on neutral, transparent and 
non-discriminatory rules. Article 8 (1a) states the maintenance of ‘grandfather’ 
rights, according to which the air carrier that has operated a slot in the previous 
scheduling period has priority over other air carriers in respect of that slot in the 
next scheduling period. Thus, primary exchanges of airport capacities, e.g. slot 
auctions are excluded. Article 8 (4) states that: ‘Slots may be freely exchanged 
between air carriers or transferred by an air carrier from one route, or type of 
service, to another, by mutual agreement or as a result of a total or partial take-
over or unilaterally.’ The interpretation of the term ‘freely exchanged’ became 
the central conflicting point in the Guernsey Transport Board Case.
21
 
 This case 
became a landmark case for the more general question, whether secondary trad-
ing of airport slots including side payments would be consistent with the Coun-
cil Regulation of 1993.  
                                                 
19  Council Regulation (EEC) No. 2408/92 of 23 July 1992 on access for Community air 
carriers to intra-Community air routes, OJ L 240/8, 24.8.1992. 
20  Council Regulation (EEC) No. 95/93 of 18 January 1993 on common rules for the  
allocation of slots at Community airports, OJ, L 014 of 22 January 1993. 
21  R v Airport Co-Ordination Ltd. Ex P. The States Of Guernsey Transport Board; High 
Court of Justice, Queen’s Bench Division (Divisional Court), Maurice Kay J, 25 
March 1999, European Law Reports 1999, pp. 745-754.    11 
The starting point in this case was that Air UK stopped the regular flight service 
from Heathrow to Guernsey in 1998 moving all activities to Stansted. The ex-
change of Air UK’s highly valuable prime slots to British Airways for valueless 
off-peak slots in combination with financial compensations raised the question, 
whether this transaction was in accordance with Council Regulation 95/93. The 
parties in dispute were The States of Guernsey Transport Board – interested in 
the continuation of flight service to Heathrow – and the Airport Coordination 
Ltd. – responsible for the allocation of slots according to Council Regulation 
95/93. According to the British High Court the meaning of the term ‘freely ex-
changed’ set down in article 8 (4) Council Regulation 95/93 does not exclude 
financial compensations in slot exchange due to the absence of legal prohibi-
tions of side payments. The application of the States of Guernsey Transport 
Board Case for juridical review by the European Court of Justice was refused by 
the High Court decision. 
 
 
4.2.  Secondary trading of airport slots 
 
Since the British High Court Decision a continuing debate on the reform of air-
port slot allocation has evolved. In the year 2000 a proposal by the European 
Commission to allow for partial auctioning of slots and introduce the explicit 
legal right of secondary trading of slots was vetoed by some Member States and 
large airline companies. A new proposal was debated by the European Parlia-
ment in 2002, designating slots as government-controlled concessions, neither 
the property of airlines nor of airports (Boyfield, 2003, pp. 35). In 2004 Council 
Regulation 95/93 was followed up by Regulation 793/2004.
22
                                                 
22   Regulation (EC) No 793/2004 of The European Parliament and of The Council of 21 
April 2004 amending Council Regulation (EEC) No 95/93 on common rules for the 
allocation of slots at Community airports, OJ L 138/50, 30.4.2004. 
 The process of 
slot allocation has been improved for example by a strengthening of the use-it-
or-lose-it rule, which determines under what conditions unused slots are reallo-
cated to newcomers. According to article 8a/1c of the new Council Regulation 
slots may be ‘exchanged one for one between air carriers’. Thus, the possibility 
of secondary trading in airport slots, including financial compensations, was   12 
again not mentioned explicitly. In 2008 the European Commission finally com-




 This new interpretation of the law by the Commission is a reac-
tion to the evolving grey markets for secondary slot trading at congested air-
ports. The reasoning in the Commission’s Communication pointing out the legal 
gap with respect to financial compensations in secondary slot trading uses the 
same arguments already provided in the British High Court Decision in the 
Guernsey Transport Board Case. 
 
4.3.  Remaining reform potentials 
 
For competition on European air transport markets to operate efficiently, non-
discriminatory access to airports must be available to all active and potential 
suppliers of airline services. At the same time efforts must be made to achieve 
efficient allocation of scarce infrastructure capacities and to cover the costs in-
volved.  
 
From this perspective the long overdue legal reform introducing secondary trad-
ing of airport slots can be considered as a first step in the right direction. At 
congested airports slots do not possess the characteristics of a homogenous 
good, but differ in market value depending on time. Depending on the flight 
characteristics (e.g. scheduled business flights, charter flights) airlines have dif-
ferent willingness to pay for slots in a peak period. Thus, regulatory constraints 
enforcing a one-for-one exchange of slots prohibit welfare improving buying 
and selling of slots. In contrast to an exchange, the possibility of selling slots 
increases the opportunity costs of hoarding slots or using them for a less lucra-
tive flight because of the scarcity rents which can be obtained from selling.  
 
                                                 
23  Communication from The Commission to The European Parliament, The Council, 
The European Economic and Social Committee and The Committee of the Regions 
on the application of Regulation (EEC) 95/93 on common rules for the allocation of 
slots at Community airports, as amended, Brussels, 30.4.2008, COM (2008) 227   
final.   13 
A more rigorous reform would be the abolishment of the ‘grandfathering rights’ 
of established airlines in favour of ex ante auctioning of takeoff and landing 
slots. This shift of the property rights of airport capacities from airlines to air-
ports would provide important incentives for airport owners. In contrast to ad-
ministrative allocation procedures, economically efficient allocation mecha-
nisms may evolve applying congestion pricing and quality of service differentia-
tion of airport capacities. Moreover, the revenues from the slot allocations could 
be used by airport owners as a contribution towards covering the decision-
relevant costs of airport capacities including the capital cost of infrastructures.  
 
Markets for infrastructure capacities evolve not only in airports but in most lib-
eralized network industries. Infrastructure capacities of telecommunications, 
railroads, ports, electricity grids and gas pipelines etc. are provided on upstream 
markets depending on the demand characteristics on the different downstream 
markets for network services. Such markets are immediately disturbed if the ca-
pacities are not allocated in a non-discriminatory manner and price signals are 
disturbed, if congestion and scarceness are ignored. Thus, legal prohibitions of 
the allocation of infrastructure capacities, such as e.g. the prohibition of secon-




5.  Negotiated versus regulated access 
 
It is an important difference whether network access is a result of private nego-
tiations with regulatory oversight completely absent or mandatory with a corre-
sponding set of regulations. It can be expected that private bargaining of unregu-
lated access conditions between competitive network providers will lead to eco-
nomically efficient solutions. In contrast to competitive networks, monopolistic 
bottlenecks in network infrastructures fundamentally disturb private bargaining 
on network access, due to the absence of economically viable alternatives. 
 
 
   14 
5.1.  Judgment of the German Federal Court of Justice:  
   Juridification of the Associations’ Agreement Electricity II plus  
 
The European Electricity Directive from 1996 gave the Member States the 
choice between negotiated and regulated third party access (Art.17).
24 In the Gas 
Directive it was Article 15 that gave this choice.
 25 The alternative of negotiated 




 According to section 6 of this act, German network owners are 
obliged to provide non-discriminatory access to energy providers. Access condi-
tions have been negotiated among the parties involved and there has been no 
regulatory authority established (negotiated third-party access). The results of 
the negotiations on principles of access conditions were laid down in trade As-
sociations’ Agreements (Verbändevereinbarungen) between electricity respec-
tively gas providers and industrial consumers. According to section 8 of the En-
ergy Industry Act a review of the experience with negotiated third-party access 
and the relevant Court rulings was ruled to take place in 2003. As a result of this 
review regulated access was not enforced, instead the Associations’ Agreements 
were even strengthened. This juridification of the Associations’ Agreements was 
laid down in the amendment to section 6 of the Energy Industry Act of 20 May 
2003 assuming that privately bargained third-party access based on the Associa-
tions’ Agreements constitutes a ‘good professional praxis’.  
In May 1998 the First Electricity Agreement was reached, implementing the 
contract path principles. This Agreement was strongly criticised, in particular for 
not adequately taking into account the opportunity costs of network usage. The 
subsequent Second Electricity Agreement became effective on January 1, 2000, 
implementing a distance independent ‘postage stamp’ pricing system. Finally, 
                                                 
24  Directive 96/92/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 December 
1996 concerning common rules for the internal market in electricity, OJ L 027/20, 
30.1.1997. 
25  Directive 98/30/EC of the European Parliament and the Council of 22 June 1998 
concerning common rules for the internal market in natural gas, OJ L 204/1, 21. 7. 
1998.  
26  Gesetz zur Neuregelung des Energiewirtschaftsrechts vom 24. April 1998, Bundes-
gesetzblatt, Jg. 1998, Teil 1, Nr. 23, ausgegeben zu Bonn am 28. April 1998.    15 




 Although the Associations’ Agreements only establish voluntary meth-
ods and criteria for setting charges, the Bundeskartellamt has expressed con-
cerns that the Associations’ Agreements could facilitate price agreements, in 
particular reducing incentives to choose lower access fees (OECD, 2004, p. 49).  
In the Judgment of the German Federal Court of Justice (Bundesgerichtshof/ 
BGH) of  October 2005  the parties in dispute  were a provider of electricity 
(Firma Lichtblick) and the local electricity network provider (Mannheimer Ver-
sorger/MVV) to whose network Lichtblick needed access.
28
 
 In two earlier deci-
sions the Higher Regional Court Karlsruhe and the Regional Court Mannheim 
came to the conclusion that the access fees of Mannheimer Versorger/MVV 
were not abusively high because they were calculated on the basis of the Asso-
ciations’ Agreements. Due to the juridification implemented in section 6 of the 
Energy Industry Act of May 2003 establishments by the Bundeskartellamt of 
violations of competition law would be ineffective because application of the 
Associations’ Agreements would reveal ‘good professional praxis’. In contrast, 
the German Federal Court of Justice rejected these decisions for several reasons. 
In this decision the claim that ‘good professional praxis’ of access pricing would 
exclude abuse of a dominant position or discrimination and thereby could not 
conflict with competition law was rejected by the Court. According to section 6 
it has to be shown that the application of the Associations’ Agreements in total, 
respectively the application of individual rules of the Associations’ Agreements, 
does not conflict with effective competition (recital 26). In particular, the burden 
of proof that the required access charges were not excessively high rests with the 
provider of network infrastructure capacities and not with the user of this infra-
structure (recital 23).  
 
 
                                                 
27  Verbändevereinbarung über Kriterien zur Bestimmung von Netznutzungsentgelten 
für elektrische Energie und über Prinzipien der Netznutzung vom 13. Dezember 
2001 (BAnz. Nr. 85b vom 8. Mai 2002). 
28  BGH, Urteil vom 18. Oktober 2005 – KZR 36/04 – OLG Karlsruhe, LG Mannheim.    16 
5.2.  Regulated access to network infrastructures  
 
The decision of the German Federal Court of Justice provided strong signals on 
the conflict potential between the parties bargaining on the conditions of net-
work access. Due to the absence of ex ante regulation the controversy centred on 
the applicability of abuse control under competition law. During these long-
standing controversies in this law case it became obvious that the asymmetry of 
market power between network access providers and service providers resulted 
in never-ending struggles and the alternative of negotiated unregulated access 
would have failed.  
 
Already in 2003 new EU directives were passed.
29 In contrast to the earlier di-
rectives of 1996 and 1998, respectively, the possibility of negotiated third party 
access was no longer considered as an alternative option to access regulation. 
Instead, national regulatory authorities responsible for ex ante regulation of ac-
cess conditions were to be designated. As a consequence, a new Energy Industry 
Act was passed in Germany in 2005.
30
 
  In July 2005 the former Regulatory 
Agency for Telecommunications and Postal Services (RegTP) was transformed 
into the Federal Network Agency (Bundesnetzagentur) taking responsibility also 
for the regulation of energy and railroads.  
A transition of negotiated third party access to regulated access also took place 
in the German railroad sector. In the first decade after the German Railroad Re-
form of 1994 the access charges of Deutsche Bahn AG had been unregulated. 
Sector-specific regulation of the German railroad sector was introduced in 2005 
                                                 
29  Directive 2003/54/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 
2003 concerning common rules for the internal market in electricity and repealing 
Directive 96/92/EC, OJ L 176/37, 15. 7. 2003 (Art. 21); Directive 2003/55/EC of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2003 concerning common rules 
for the internal markets in natural gas and repealing Directive 98/30/EC, OJ L 
176/57, 15. 7. 2003 (Art. 23).  
30  Gesetz über die Elektrizitäts- und Gasversorgung vom 7. Juli 2005, BGBl I 2005,  
p. 1970.   17 
by the new Rail Infrastructure Utilisation Regulation.




 a set of detailed requirements has been specified in order to 
improve the transparency of the principles and criteria for the allocation of track 
capacities as well as the principles of access tariffs. Negotiations concerning the 
level of infrastructure charges are only permitted, if they are carried out under 
the supervision of the national regulatory bodies.  
 
5.3.  Remaining reform potentials 
 
Market power involved in monopolistic bottleneck infrastructures fundamentally 
disturbs private bargaining on network access. One extreme alternative could be 
(vertical) foreclosure of competitors on a complementary service market. Such a 
tying can be used as a method of price discrimination, enabling a monopolist to 
earn higher profits. Another way of abusing market power within the bargaining 
process on access conditions is to provide insufficient network access quality or 
demand excessive access charges. Thus, it is necessary to differentiate between 
those areas in which active and potential competition can work and other areas 
(monopolistic bottlenecks), where a natural monopoly situation in combination 
with irreversible costs exists. 
 
The introduction of ex ante regulation of access to the electricity transmission 
networks as well as to railway infrastructure can be seen as a progress. How-
ever, ex ante regulation should be phased out as soon as the monopolistic bottle-
                                                 
31  Verordnung zum Erlass und zur Änderung eisenbahnrechtlicher Vorschriften vom 3. 
Juni 2005, Bundesgesetzblatt Jahrgang 2005, Teil I Nr. 32, ausgegeben zu Bonn am 
13. Juni 2005, S. 1566-1577. 
32  The Rail Infrastructure Package contains 3 Directives: Directive 2001/12/EC of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 26 February 2001 amending Council  
Directive 91/440/EEC on the development of the Community’s railways, OJ L75/1, 
15. 3. 2001; Directive 2001/13/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
26 February 2001 amending Council Directive 95/18/EC on the licensing of railway 
undertakings, OJ L 75/26, 15. 3. 2001; Directive 2001/14/EC of the European Par-
liament and of the Council of 26 February 2001 on the allocation of railway infra-
structure capacity and the levying of charges for the use of railway infrastructure and 
safety certification, OJ L 75/29, 15. 3. 2001.   18 
neck disappears. The telecommunications sector provides an important example 
in this respect. For example, ex ante regulation of access to ducts of the last mile 
is only required as long as alternative interactive broadband infrastructures are 
not available (Blankart, Knieps, Zenhäusern, 2007).  
 
 
6.  The fallacies of cost-based access regulation 
 
Regulated access centres on the access conditions for the provider of network 
services. Competitive supply of network services requires non-discriminatory 
access to network infrastructures, efficient allocation of infrastructure capacities, 
and viability of network owners. The incentives of entrants to invest in competi-
tive network components should not be disturbed and the incentives of the in-
cumbents to invest in monopolistic bottleneck components should not be dis-
turbed either.  
 
 
6.1.  Judgment of the European Court: The ‘Arcor’ Case 
 
The starting point of this case was the regulation applied to unbundled access to 
the local loop. According to Regulation (EC) No 2887/2000 rates for unbundled 
access to the local loops are to be set on the basis of cost-orientation (article 3 
(3)).
33 The parties in dispute were the telecommunications provider Arcor, offer-
ing ISDN telephone extensions for end consumers on one hand and the Federal 
Network Agency (Bundesnetzagentur), Bundesrepublik Deutschland and 
Deutsche Telekom on the other hand.
34
                                                 
33  Regulation (EC) No 2887/2000 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 
December 2000 on unbundled access to the local loop, OJ L336/4, 20.12.2000.   
 By a decision of March 2001 the Federal 
Network Agency (partially) approved Deutsche Telekom’s rates for unbundled 
access to the local loop. In April 2001 Arcor rejected this decision complaining 
that the approved rates were too high in an action to the Administrative Court, 
34  Judgment of the European Court (Fourth Chamber), of 24 April 2008. - Arcor AG & 
Co. KG v Bundesrepublik Deutschland, intervening party: Deutsche Telekom AG - 
Case C-55/06. European Court Report 2008, p. I-02931.   19 
Cologne (Verwaltungsgericht Köln). Since Regulation (EC) No 2887/2000 
leaves open what the relevant cost concept is, how the relevant costs should be 
calculated, and how the costs should be related to the regulated access charges, 
in January 2006 the Administrative Court, Cologne asked the European Court of 




The key conflicting point was the determination of the cost basis. According to 
Arcor the cost calculation should be based exclusively on historical costs with 
the subsequent possibility of an almost entirely depreciated network and result-
ing very low tariffs (recital 104). According to Deutsche Telekom and the Fed-
eral Network Agency the costs would have to be calculated based exclusively on 
current costs evaluated at forward-looking or current value of an efficient opera-
tor (recitals 89, 96).  
 
The European Court decided in his judgment that the cost calculation for access 
to the local loop cannot be based exclusively on historical costs (recital 108). 
However, a clear statement in favour of the exclusive application of current cost 
accounting is also not given: ‘…the national regulatory authorities have to take 
account of actual costs, namely costs already paid by the notified operator, and 
forward looking costs, the latter being based, where relevant, on the estimation 
of the costs of replacing the network or certain parts thereof’ (recital 193, rule 
2). Moreover, in the absence of complete and comprehensible accounting docu-
ments national regulatory authorities may determine the costs on the basis of an 
analytical bottom-up or top-down cost model (recital 193, rule 4). Furthermore, 
the national regulatory authorities have broad discretion concerning the assess-
ment of the tariffs for unbundled access to the local loop including discretion to 





                                                 
35  For the history of the case in the main proceedings and the questions referred see  
recital 32 ff. of the Judgment of the European Court, European Court Report 2008,  
p. I-02931.   20 
6.2.  Decision-based costing in liberalized network industries 
 
In the context of the ‘Arcor’ Case it became obvious that in Regulation (EC) No 
2887/2000 the economic criteria for the regulation of costing and pricing were 
missing. Socially efficient use of scarce resources requires a symmetric treat-
ment of owners and users of infrastructures. Regulated access charges should 
not disturb incentives for socially efficient investments in network infrastruc-
tures, neither for the incumbents nor for the entrants. In particular, incumbents 
have no incentives to invest in infrastructure, if regulated access charges do not 
allow covering the decision-relevant costs. 
 
In liberalized telecommunications markets, companies are under market pres-
sure to make consistent business decisions (regarding investments, product de-
sign, pricing, etc.), which in turn is only possible through the consistent use of 
corporate current cost accounting (Salinger, 1998). Historical cost data – based 
on the purchase price of durable assets and (historical) accounting depreciation 
practices  –  cannot provide decision-relevant information on forward-looking 
access costs. The determination of forward-looking costs depends in large part 
on the company’s expectations regarding future market trends, technological 
progress, etc. The formation of such expectations should be left to the company 
that must also bear the consequences of the decisions made on that basis. As a 
matter of necessity, the company’s  outlook is future-directed (“forward-
looking”), making it necessary to re-evaluate plant and equipment and adjust the 
economic depreciation in accordance with the market opportunities expected 
(Knieps, Küpper, Langen, 2001, p. 768).  
 
Current-cost accounting methods have to take into account the path-dependency 
of network evolution. As long as the incremental costs of upgrading of the estab-
lished carrier are lower than the stand-alone costs of an entrant’s hypothetical 
new network, the required network capacity can be provided more efficiently by 
the historically grown network of the established carrier. Path-dependent in-
vestments of gradual upgrading strategies are then economically efficient and 
also relevant from a forward-looking perspective. In contrast, analytical cost 
models developed by engineering-economic methods are creating simulated   21 
(hypothetical) data. By their very nature they are not able to take into account 
the path-dependency of the existing networks. Although analytical cost models 
can provide decision-relevant cost signals for newcomers faced with the deci-
sion of building a new network, these cost models are not able to derive deci-
sion-relevant costs for the historically grown network of the established carrier 
(Knieps, 2000, p. 112).  
 
 
6.3.  Remaining reform potentials 
 
Although cost based access regulation in telecommunications markets is still the 
dominant instrument applied, the current debate on access regulation in network 
industries is increasingly moving towards incentive regulation.
36
 
 Price cap regu-
lation in the monopolistic bottleneck areas and accounting separation are suffi-
ciently capable of disciplining the remaining market power and ensuring non-
discriminatory access to monopolistic bottleneck components. This will not only 
reduce regulatory work, but also create entrepreneurial incentives to seek out 
cost savings and develop innovative pricing structures. A substantial price diffe-
rentiation potential exists which should be exploited for the benefit of consum-
ers (Willig, 1978). The welfare-increasing effects of price differentiation should 
not be impeded by regulatory intervention. The development of innovative rate 
structures must be an option open to all providers. All market participants 
should have the opportunity of providing optional rates, multiple rates, non-
linear price structures, etc.  
 
7.  Concluding remarks 
After the abolishment of legal entry barriers in European network industries the 
evolution of access regulation is an ongoing process strongly influenced by 
landmark court cases. The cases considered in this paper not only initiated the 
                                                 
36  See, for example, the introduction of incentive regulation in the German energy 
sector: Verordnung über die Anreizregulierung der Energieversorgungsnetze 
(Anreizregulierungsverordnung – ARegV), 29. Oktober 2007.   22 
liberalization process of the markets for network services but also provided an 
important signaling function for the major dimensions of remaining regulatory 
problems. As the ‘Bronner’ Case has shown, there is always the danger of a 
misspecification of the regulatory basis, resulting in unjustified regulation in 
competitive network areas. As the ‘Guernsey Transport Board’ Case has shown, 
regulators should not disturb the functioning of the markets for network capaci-
ties. As the ‘Associations’ Agreement Electricity’ Case has shown, negotiated 
unregulated access is not an adequate substitute for ex ante regulation of net-
work-specific market power. Finally, the ‘Arcor’ Case has shown the fallacies of 
cost-based regulation. Although the law cases by their very nature focus on a 
specific regulatory problem raised by the parties in dispute, the court decisions 
not only influenced the regulatory framework in the underlying industry but also 
in the other network industries. 
 
In the meantime the bandwagon towards sector-symmetric market power regula-
tion based on economically founded principles is gaining increasing momentum. 
Free entry into network industries, limiting the regulatory basis to network-
specific market power, reducing or phasing-out access regulation as a result of 
shrinking or vanishing monopolistic bottlenecks, and the disaggregated applica-
tion of incentive regulation as a superior substitute for cost-based regulation are 
the major characteristics of these developments. Examples are the introduction 
of incentive regulation in the energy sector or the phasing-out of regulation of 
long-distance telecommunications markets. Nevertheless, further reform poten-
tials are to be exhausted in the future. Phasing-out potentials in telecommunica-
tions markets are still not fully exploited, grandfathering rights of airport slots 
still exist, water networks are still not open, and a sector-symmetric application 
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